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We survey the extant literature on the effects of both a bank’s organizational structure 
and the physical distance separating it from the lender on lending decisions. Banks do 
engage in spatial pricing, where the underlying mechanism can be both transportation 
costs and information asymmetries. Moreover, their ability to discriminate is bounded by 
the reach of the lending technology of surrounding competitors. It is not entirely clear 
from  an  empirical  viewpoint  that  small,  decentralized  banks  have  a  comparative 
advantage  in  relationship  lending.  Differences  in  data  and  methodology  may  explain 
these mixed findings. If it does exist, this advantage can be motivated theoretically by the 
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1.  Introduction 
The  last  two  decades  have  witnessed  profound  changes  in  the  landscape  of  the 
banking  industry,  especially  in  the  U.S.  and  Europe.  Deregulation  gave  rise  to  an 
unprecedented  wave  of  consolidation  activity  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  relentless 
technological progress in information processing and communication abilities redefined 
the operational scope of financial intermediation. A first order effect of technological 
development seems to have been an increase in the contestability of financial markets. In 
particular, the facility with which information can now be communicated across large 
distances resulted in an increase in the  geographical reach  of  all potential financiers. 
Banks – whose lending activities traditionally relied on their superior ability to overcome 
informational asymmetries in the credit market – have been forced to revise their modus 
operandi in order to face these new challenges. Widely voiced concerns regarding the 
potential effects of the referred turbulence in banking markets on the economic activity 
promptly soared. In particular, these voices questioned to what extent small firms – the 
engine of economic growth and those that most critically depend on bank financing – 
would be affected by these changes. 
Among  the  various  consequences  of  the  complex  reorganization  in  the  banking 
industry,  two  of  them  are  particularly  visible:  banks  are  becoming  larger  and  more 
hierarchically complex and they are expanding in their geographical span. In this chapter 
we review the extant literature on the effects of both a bank’s organizational structure and 
the  physical  distance  separating  it  from  the  lender  on  lending  decisions.  This  is,  we 
believe, a natural step towards understanding the effects on the economic activity of the 
sea changes taking place in the banking industry, and the fact this topic has recently 
attracted great attention of researchers seems to cope with this view. 
Despite  the  existence  of  a  rich  theoretical  background  to  understand  the  relation 
between  organizational  structure,  distance  and  lending  conditions,  providing  proper 
empirical tests of these theories has proved an extremely challenging task. One major 
difficulty is brought up by data limitations. Fortunately, substantial progress has been 
made in recent years in this respect.    4
The available evidence suggests that the distance between the borrower and the lender 
is inversely proportional to the degree of local market power the lender possesses, as the 
theory predicts. Less obvious is the mechanism driving this effect. The theory suggests 
that both transportation costs and information asymmetries could induce banks to engage 
in spatial pricing, but the existing evidence is mixed with this respect; in particular, we 
should not reject the possibility that both explanations have their own legitimacy. 
The role of organizational structure on lending decisions is also far from being a 
settled issue. Again, data limitations are certainly behind the inability of the empirical 
literature to reach a consensus. Although the bulk of the evidence indicates that small, 
decentralized  banks  are  better  in  providing  relationship  loans,  there  are  also  some 
conflicting  signals,  which  may  reflect  more  than  simply  differences  in  empirical 
methodology or data. Apparently, the heavy reliance on “soft” information in relationship 
lending is what creates  the difference between lending technologies, i.e. transactional 
versus relationship lending. Yet it is by no means clear where the competitive advantage 
of  small  banks  in  providing  relationship  loans  stems  from.  Among  competing 
explanations,  we  have  banks’  internal  agency  costs,  vertical  and  horizontal 
communication costs (across hierarchies and across distance) and incentives of the credit 
staff  to  produce  information,  all  of  which  are  strongly  linked  to  the  organizational 
structure of the bank.  
Recent  attention  has  also  been  drawn  to  the  interrelation  between  organizational 
structure and distance as mutual determinants of a lending technology, and hence lending 
conditions. The coexistence of different lending technologies has a non-trivial effect on 
the structure of banking markets since the geographical reach of each organization not 
only is determined by its own choices, but as well by the choices made by the competing 
banks. In particular, it seems that a bank’s geographical reach as well as its ability to 
price discriminate is negatively related to the reach of the competitors operating in the 
vicinity.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
relation between distance and credit decisions. Section 3 summarizes the literature on the 
relation between organizational structure and credit decisions. Section 4 concludes.   5
2.  Distance and Credit Decisions 
If a borrower is not located next to a bank, the distance between them can act like a 
“physical gap” separating them.
1 Economic theory has long recognized physical distance 
as a source of inefficiency in credit markets, causing potentially relevant economic costs 
for both the banks granting credit and the firms seeking financing.
2 Market imperfections 
arise because, for given physical locations of borrower and lender, distance creates an 
imbalance in the competitive environment in the credit market. In particular, distance 
shifts market power towards the bank that is closest located to the firm; banks located 
further  away  are  at  a  competitive  disadvantage,  since  establishing  ties  with  far-away 
firms requires a higher effort. Not only are there distance-related pecuniary costs such as 
transportation costs, but there may also be extra efforts required from the bank to assess 
the creditworthiness of potential borrowers or to monitor firms’ investments. 
Recent  structural  changes  in  the  banking  industry  stemming  from  technological 
progress  (DeYoung,  Hunter  and  Udell  (2004)  and  Petersen  and  Rajan  (2002))  and 
consolidation activity (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)) have resulted in a substantial 
increase in the geographical reach of banks; consequently, these changes have developed 
renewed  interest  in  the  role  of  borrower  location  on  lending  behavior.  A  handful  of 
empirical studies now analyze how physical distance separating a bank from its clients 
affects lending decisions, i.e. the availability and cost of credit for firms.  
We start by reviewing the theoretical literature on spatial pricing. Following Degryse 
and  Ongena  (2005),  we  discuss  two  broad  channels  through  which  distance  affects 
lending decisions: transportation costs and asymmetry of information.
3 In the subsequent 
chapter we review the empirical evidence on spatial pricing and spatial rationing. 
                                                 
1 Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro (2006) call this operational distance.  
2 An overview of the relevancy of geography in banking is provided in Degryse and Ongena (2004). 
3 In the subsequent theoretical exposition we disregard long-run dynamics by treating the number of banks 
(or the level of competition) as given. The empirical studies we will analyze cope with this view since they 
employ samples spanning short time periods. Typically, harsher competition translates into lower loan rates 
since it reduces the average distances between all possible combinations of firms and neighboring banks. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  banks  aggravates  the  adverse  selection  problem  by 
enabling low-quality firms to obtain financing (Broecker (1990)) and may result in a retrenchment towards 
relationship lending (Hauswald and Marquez (2006)), resulting in higher loan rates.   6
2.1. Theory 
2.1.1.  Transportation Costs 
Transportation  costs  may  relate  to  time,  effort  and  effective  outlays  born  by  a 
borrower  who  seeks  to  personally  interact  with  a  potential  financier.  The  effect  of 
transportation costs on pricing behavior has been formalized in the context of location or 
product differentiation models (see the seminal papers by Hotelling (1929) and Salop 
(1979); see  Lederer and Hurter (1986) for a more general approach). More recently, 
Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995) propose a spatial competition model of the 
banking sector.
4 These models commonly predict that, while firms may incur different 
transportation costs, banks resort to pool pricing, as they do not observe the location of 
the borrowers.
5 Banks customarily know the addresses of their loan applicants, however, 
making this assumption rather implausible. If banks know applicants’ addresses, banks 
can engage in spatial price discrimination based on the physical distance separating them 
from the firm. Greater distance and hence larger transportation costs result in stronger 
(local) monopoly power for the bank; accordingly, a bank optimally charges higher loan 
rates to those borrowers that are located closest to its bank branch. Of course, monopoly 
power is defined in this setting for given locations of potential competitors. The rationale 
is that closer borrowers face higher transportation costs when visiting competing banks 
that are located further  away than the lending bank. This allows the lending bank to 
increase the loan rate by an amount equivalent, in the limiting case, to the opportunity 
transportation cost faced by the borrower. 
In  the  same  way,  banks  may  incur  transportation  costs  related  to  their  lending 
activities, in particular while screening applicants and monitoring borrowers. Banks may 
subsequently pass along these costs to the firms by setting higher loan rates. However, 
the fact that total monitoring costs increases with the borrower-lender distance opens 
another window of opportunity for banks to engage in discriminatory pricing. Sussman 
and Zeira (1995) formalize this idea in a costly-state-verification framework and show 
that banks have local economies of scale with advantages for monitoring the closer they 
are  to  their  clients.  In  other  words,  lenders  can  extract  rents  from  closer  borrowers 
                                                 
4 See also Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a review of models of spatial differentiation in banking. 
5 Notice that location is not exogenous in these models. See for instance Hoover (1936) for a spatial price 
discrimination model with fixed locations.   7
because more distant competing banks take into account their own higher monitoring 
costs in their loan terms offers. 
In short, spatial price discrimination models based on transportation costs entail the 
following empirical predictions: (i) a negative relationship between the loan rate and the 
borrower-lender distance, and (ii) a positive relationship between the loan rate and the 
borrower-closest competing bank distance. 
2.1.2.  Asymmetry of Information 
In the transportation-cost models analyzed, spatial discrimination simply takes place 
through loan pricing. If the severity of the asymmetric information problem intensifies 
with distance, then banks can strategically use their informational advantage to create a 
threat of adverse selection for their rivals, and thus soften competition. Hauswald and 
Marquez  (2006),  for  example,  develop  a  model  where  the  quality  of  a  bank’s 
information-generation process is a decreasing function of the distance separating it from 
the  borrower.
6  Because  banks  receive  more  precise  signals  about  close  borrowers, 
competing  banks  face  increasing  adverse  selection  problems  when  approaching  these 
locally captured firms. As a result, the informed relationship bank can charge higher loan 
rates  to  closer  firms.  An  increase  in  distance  between  borrower  and  bank,  however, 
curtails the bank’s incentives to invest in information-generation activities. Consequently, 
distance weakens the bank’s capability to extract rents from relationship borrowers, at the 
same time as  it  aggravates  adverse selection  problems  for  the  lender  with  respect  to 
transactional borrowers. Interestingly, the predictions in Hauswald and Marquez (2006) 
on loan pricing resemble those from transportation-cost models, i.e. loan rates decrease in 
the distance between the borrower and the relationship lender, but increase in the distance 
between the borrower and the competing transactional banks. As we will see later, the 
coinciding  predictions  on  the  role  of  distance  on  loan  rates  stemming  from  such 
dissimilar theoretical arguments poses serious identification challenges at the empirical 
level.  
Spatial  pricing  models  based  on  informational  asymmetries  also  demonstrate  that 
geographical credit rationing by banks can occur in equilibrium, where the underlying 
                                                 
6 Almazan (2002) analyzes a related model in which a bank’s monitoring ability is also a decreasing 
function of the borrower-bank distance.   8
rationale is an adverse selection mechanism close in spirit to that in Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981).  For instance, the model in Hauswald  and Marquez (2006) predicts that more 
distant applicants are more likely to be credit rationed, as banks face an increasing type II 
error; in other words, lending decisions become less efficient with increasing distance. A 
similar prediction is put forward by Carling and Lundberg (2005), who propose a simple 
theoretical  model  to  rationalize  the  existence  of  geographical  credit  rationing.  As  in 
Hauswald and Marquez (2006), they also postulate that the precision of the signal that a 
bank receives when assessing a borrower’s default probability decreases with distance, 
and show that banks optimally turn down credit applications from some distantly located 
firms. Carling and Lundberg (2005) illustrate the idea that physical distance aggravates 
the  information  asymmetry  problem  with  a  figurative  paradigm,  the  Church  Tower 
Principle (CTP). According to the CTP, a bank is on the church tower, and its visual 
ability to observe the quality of the surrounding firms is constrained by the distance at 
which the firm is located from the tower. 
2.2. Empirical Evidence 
2.2.1.  Spatial Pricing 
Few empirical studies have investigated whether banks engage in spatial pricing. The 
main difficulty in doing so is, in general, the lack of data that allows the econometrician 
to identify the effect of the borrower-lender distance on loan prices, while simultaneously 
controlling for other correlated factors. Such factors comprise the proximity of potential 
competitors, the geographic density (i.e. the size) of the banking market and the nature of 
the relationship between the lender and the borrower.
7 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) are the first to provide evidence of spatial loan pricing. 
They employ the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) and find that 
a borrower located around the corner from the lender pays on average 126 basis points 
more  than  a  borrower  located  9  miles  (the  sample  median)  from  the  lender.  While 
economically  and  statistically  relevant,  the  estimated  coefficient  might  be  potentially 
                                                 
7 This concern follows from growing evidence on the complex web of relations tying market concentration, 
the nature of the bank-firm relationships, the cost of capital and physical distance. For instance, in highly 
concentrated banking markets we observe on average higher loan rates (see e.g. Degryse and Ongena 
(2006)) and (obviously) larger physical distances between banks and firms. Moreover, relationship lending 
typically corresponds to higher loan rates (Boot (2000)), but also to shorter distances between lenders and 
borrowers (Berger et al. (2005)).   9
biased due to the omission of the aforementioned control variables. Moreover, Petersen 
and Rajan (2002) use predicted distance rather than actual distance in their regressions, 
where they calculate predicted distance by projecting a set of variables associated to the 
credit quality of the firm on observed distance. For the reason that predicted distance is 
essentially  a  measure of firm transparency, their results primarily suggest that higher 
quality firms pay lower risk premia. Still, because more transparent firms have greater 
predicted distance, their findings can also be interpreted as evidence that banks engage in 
spatial loan pricing. 
In a recent study, Degryse and Ongena (2005) provide more comprehensive evidence 
on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. They employ a dataset 
comprising  the  entire  loan  portfolio  of  an  important  Belgian  bank  that  operates 
throughout Belgium. Unlike the data set employed by Petersen and Rajan (2002), the 
dataset used in Degryse and Ongena (2005) contains information on both the distance 
between the borrower and its lending bank and the distance between the borrower and 
other competing  banks,  as well  as  measures  of  banking  competition.  In  addition,  the 
dataset covers a narrow period of time (1995-1997), during which major technological 
shifts  were  unlikely  to  have  occurred.  As  a  result,  Degryse  and  Ongena  (2005)  can 
empirically test hypotheses generated by static spatial pricing models. They find that an 
increase in traveling distance from zero to the sample median (about 4 minutes) drops the 
expected  loan  rate  by  14  basis  points.  In  addition,  they  obtain  a  symmetric  and 
qualitatively similar impact on the loan rate resulting from an analogous increase in the 
distance to the closest (quartile) competitor, a result that may reflect linear transportation 
costs.
8  From  a  variety  of  exercises,  Degryse  and  Ongena  (2005)  confirm  that 
transportation costs is the likely cause of the spatial price discrimination documented for 
                                                 
8 The cost of one traveling minute equals 3.5 basis points in Degryse and Ongena (2005) and about 5.4 
basis points in Petersen and Rajan (2002) (we infer the average speed in the U.S. from Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2006)). This disparity may largely pertain to differences between the two countries in the value 
of time, which we approximate by the ratio of their GDP per capita in 1995. Taking into account the 
computed factor reduces the gap in estimates to the point of insignificance. We find this result surprising 
given the differences in sample composition and population density between Belgium and the U.S. and 
given the evidence that the distance between banks and borrowers has steadily increased in recent times 
(Petersen and Rajan (2002)), whereas physical proximity apparently is still common in European markets 
(Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) and Buch (2005)).   10
Belgium,  though  they  do  not  entirely  exclude  adverse  selection  as  an  alternative 
explanation.
9, 10 
In an ensuing study, Agarwal and Hauswald (2006) exploit a novel dataset from a 
major U.S. bank to analyze the effect of borrower proximity on credit-market conditions. 
In line with the findings in Degryse and Ongena (2005), Agarwal and Hauswald (2006) 
provide further evidence for loan price discrimination based on firm-bank distance. Their 
results suggest that a borrower located around the corner from the lender pays on average 
195 basis points more than a borrower located 2.6 miles (the sample median) from the 
lender. In addition, an increase in a firm’s traveling distance to the closest competing 
bank from zero to the sample median (0.55 miles) raises the loan rate by 55 basis points. 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2006) subsequently show that the statistical significance of these 
results  nearly  vanishes  with  the  introduction  of  a  proxy  for  the  bank’s  proprietary 
information  about  the  borrower  (the  bank’s  internal  credit  score).  Accordingly,  they 
conclude that physical distance is simply a proxy for a lender’s informational advantage, 
hence  providing  support  for  models  of  price  discrimination  based  on  information 
asymmetries.
11 
2.2.2.  Spatial Rationing 
In theoretical models founded on information asymmetries (Hauswald and Marquez 
(2006)  and  Carling  and  Lundberg  (2005)),  geographical  credit  rationing  may  be  the 
bank’s optimal response to the deterioration of the quality of the information pertaining 
to  distantly  located  firms.  Yet  it  is  not  clear  from  an  empirical  point  of  view  that 
geographical credit rationing exists. For instance, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that 
applications from more distantly located firms are turned down more often in the U.S., 
though this effect has sharply decreased over time. In contrast, Agarwal and Hauswald 
(2006) find that the effect of distance on the likelihood of credit denial nearly vanishes 
once they properly control in their regressions for the credit quality of the borrowers, 
suggesting that the adverse selection problem relates to the quality of the firm, rather than 
                                                 
9 For instance, they find in one of these exercises that borrowers located in densely populated (i.e. urban) 
areas experience discrimination twice as harshly, which is probably related to higher traveling times in 
urban areas due to traffic congestion. 
10 In a recent study, Casolaro and Mistrulli (2007) find with an Italian dataset that spatial pricing is mainly 
confined to transactional loans, where asymmetries of information are likely to be less of an issue. 
11  The  bank’s  internal  credit  score  itself  could  also  be  the  avenue  through  which  loan  officers  price 
discriminate, a possibility not addressed in their paper.   11
to distance. Findings by Carling and Lundberg (2005) and Uchida, Udell and Watanabe 
(2007) indicate the absence of distance related credit rationing in Sweden and Japan, 
respectively. 
 We offer three potential, not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations for the lack 
of conclusive evidence on the incidence of spatial credit rationing. First, as suggested in 
Petersen and Rajan (2002), technological progress may be indeed breaking the “tyranny 
of distance” in small business lending. Petersen and Rajan (2002) also document that this 
trend goes back as far as the late 1970s, which might explain why studies that employ 
more recent data do not find evidence of spatial credit rationing. Second, transportation 
costs (that are fixed per loan), rather than informational asymmetries, may be to a large 
extent  driving  the  spatial  price  discrimination  documented  (as  Degryse  and  Ongena 
(2005) argue). Third, we have disregarded so far the firm’s incentives concerning the 
choice  of  a  financing  provider.  Relationship  lending  has  been  often  recognized  as  a 
market  response  to  potential  credit  rationing,  which  primarily  affects  small  firms. 
Relationship lending relies largely on “soft” information (e.g. a character assessment) 
that is accumulated over time by the bank through multiple interactions with the firm. 
Because this “soft” information is typically collected and processed at the local level (as 
it requires a physical presence) and since it is not easily transferable (see Petersen (2004) 
and  Stein  (2002)),  relationship  lending  becomes  less  feasible  across  large  distances. 
Consistent with this view, there is evidence that small firms seek to establish ties with 
local financial institutions (see Amel and Brevoort (2005), Kwast, Starr-McCluer and 
Wolken (1997)). This is corroborated by the findings of a strong negative correlation 
between the firm-bank distance and the likelihood that they build strong ties (Berger et al. 
(2005), Petersen and Rajan (2002)). This suggests that the empirical literature may have 
failed  to  detect  spatial  credit  rationing  simply  because  small  firms  internalize  the 
pervasive effects of information asymmetries by seeking relationship loans from local 
banks.
12 
                                                 
12 The evidence that the geographic density of banking markets has increased substantially (Petersen and 
Rajan (2002)) reinforces this claim.   12
2.2.3.  Distance and Collateral Requirement 
We  are  not  aware  of  any  empirical  study  investigating  the  effect  of  bank-firm 
distance on collateral requirements. Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) 
find that collateralized loans are made, in average, at greater physical distance from the 
lender. However, they assume in their regressions that the causation effect goes from the 
collateral  variable  to  the  distance  variable,  hence  disregarding  potential  endogeneity 
issues.
13 
We  believe  that  an  empirical  test  of  the  effect  of  physical  distance  on  collateral 
requirements  would  shed  light  on  the  nature  of  the  mechanisms  underlying  the 
documented  spatial  pricing.  For  instance,  if  information  asymmetries  are  driving  the 
observed  spatial  pricing,  as  adverted  in  Agarwal  and  Hauswald  (2006),  then  the 
likelihood that the loan is secured by collateral should increase with distance (ceteris 
paribus). In contrast, if collateral requirements are not related to distance, then we can 
rely on the models based on transportation costs to explain spatial pricing (as in Degryse 
and Ongena (2005)). 
We estimate the effect of the distance between borrower and lender (Distance) on the 
likelihood  that  the  loan  is  secured  by  collateral  (Collateral).
14  For  this  purpose  we 
employ both the 1993 NSSBF  and the Belgian dataset used by Degryse and Ongena 
(2005).
15 By applying the two datasets we can retain differences between Belgium and 
U.S. in banking markets landscapes as a possible route to reconcile the conflicting views 
of Degryse and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2006). 
First,  we  present  the  results  for  the  1993  NSSBF  data  set  of  estimating  a  logit 
regression of Collateral as a function of firm, loan characteristics and Distance.
16 Our 
                                                 
13 In fact, a more correct interpretation of the theory (e.g. Hauswald and Marquez (2006)) is that distance 
has  a  casual  effect  on  the  severity  of  information  asymmetries,  and  therefore  on  the  probability  that 
collateral is pledged. Collateral is perceived as a component in loan contracts that arises as a consequence 
of  moral  hazard  (Boot,  Thakor  and  Udell  (1991))  and/or  adverse  selection  (Bester  (1985),  Chan  and 
Kanatas (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987)) in credit markets. 
14 We believe that in a sequential setting it is more sensible to assume that the choice of the lending bank 
(where the distance is implied) precedes the design of the loan contract. This is the case by definition when 
the firm has a pre-established relationship with the bank.   
15  Unfortunately,  the  two  datasets  contain  different  types  of  information,  which  restrains  us  from 
performing a totally controlled (i.e. ceteris paribus) empirical test. 
16 We use a specification similar to that in Chakraborty and Hu (2006) (model (1) in table 2, p. 97), who 
also employ the 1993 NSSBF, with the following differences: (i) we use the variable Main Bank as a proxy 
for the scope of the bank-firm relationship rather than the number of financial services, (ii) we correct the   13
findings, reported in table 1, indicate that an increase in distance between lender and 
borrower from zero to the sample median raises the probability of the loan being secured 
by  collateral  by  2%.
17  The  effect  is  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  but 
economically modest (as the sample median loan is secured by collateral). Second, we 
perform the same exercise using the Belgian sample. We report the results in table 2. 
Employing a specification identical to that used in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) 
(model  (1)  in  table  III,  p.  105)  we  find  a  negative,  though  both  economically  and 
statistically  negligible  effect  of  Distance  on  Collateral.  We  also  acknowledge  a 
substantial difference in fit between the two models (in terms of pseudo-R
2); in particular, 
it seems that the information contained in the Belgian sample is far more relevant in 
predicting when a loan is secured by collateral. 
These results are not necessarily inconsistent with the view that different mechanisms 
may  drive  spatial  pricing  discrimination  in  loan  markets  in  U.S.  and  Belgium.  In 
particular, our findings do not contradict the finding in Degryse and Ongena (2005) that 
transportation  costs  cause  the  discrimination  they  document  for  Belgium,  whereas 
asymmetries of information seem to be an important determinant of the spatial pricing 
discrimination observed for the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
age of the firm by the duration of the relationship between bank and firm, and (iii) we that add to the model 
the bank-firm distance (the variable of interest), as well as a variable indicating whether the firm is located 
in a Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
17 Recent empirical evidence supports collateral as a device to solve moral hazard problems (see Cerqueiro, 
Degryse and Ongena (2007), who similarly employ the 1993 NSSBF, and Jimenez, Salas and Saurina 
(2006)).   14
Table 1  
Incidence of collateral in the 1993 NSSBF 
 
The table lists the coefficients and the standard errors from a logit regression where the dependent variable is one if the 
firm pledged collateral for the most recent loan. Besides the variables reported, each regression includes eight 2-digits SIC 
code dummies and three variables controlling for the type of organization of the firm. We refer to Chakraborty and Hu 
(2006) for a detailed description of the dataset and variables. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variable  Coefficient   Standard 
Error 
       
Log of length of relationship (years)  -0.27 ***  0.08 
Main bank (0/1)  -0.27 *  0.15 
Number of borrowing sources  0.01   0.03 
Log of firm’s age at start of relationship (years)  -0.24   0.21 
Log of total assets  0.14 ***  0.04 
Debt-to-assets ratio  0.10   0.07 
Profit-to assets ratio  0.02   0.02 
MSA (0/1)  -0.15   0.14 
Distance to lender (miles)  0.08 **  0.04 
       
       
Number of Observations  1,656 
Pseudo-R
2 (%)  4.83 
       
 
   15
Table 2 
Incidence of collateral in the Belgian sample 
The table lists the coefficients and standard errors from a logit regression where the dependent variable is one if the firm 
pledged collateral for the most recent loan. Besides the variables reported, each regression includes 49 two-digit NACE 
industry dummies, eight regional dummies, two year dummies, four dummies for the revisibility of the loan, five dummies 
for the purpose of the loan and three dummies for the governance characteristics of the firm. We remit to Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000) for a detailed description of the dataset and variables. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variable  Coefficient   Standard 
Error 
       
Small firm (0/1)  0.73 **  0.34 
Log of length of relationship (years)  0.57   0.10 
Main bank (0/1)  -0.09 ***  0.06 
Log of loan size  0.47 ***  0.08 
Log of repayment duration  0.62 ***  0.16 
Distance to lender (minutes)  -0.03   0.06 
       
       
Number of Observations  15,044 
Pseudo-R
2 (%)  80.29 
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3.  Organizational Structure and Credit 
A recent body of literature draws attention to the relation between the organizational 
structure of a bank and its proclivity to provide credit to particular types of firms. This 
literature  is  founded  on  the  view  that  relationship  lending  is  associated  with  an 
intrinsically different lending process than transactional lending. As a result, a bank that 
favors  relationship  lending  requires  a  different  organizational  form  from  one  that 
specializes in arm’s length lending (Berger and Udell (2002)).  
Under relationship lending, loan officers collect proprietary information over time 
through  frequent  and  personal  contacts  with  their  clients,  as  well  as  with  the  local 
community. This information is “soft” in nature, being difficult to store and credibly 
communicate to others, creating within a firm challenges at the organizational level. In 
particular, large banks, where multiple layers of management separate the agents who 
collect this “soft” information from the ultimate decision-makers, may have a competitive 
disadvantage  in  relationship  lending  (Berger  and  Udell  (2002))  and  Stein  (2002)).  In 
contrast,  a  complex  organizational  structure  may  give  the  bank  an  advantage  in 
transactions-based lending, where the decisions are essentially based on automatisms that 
are  fed  on  objective  criteria,  or  “hard”  information  (e.g.  balance  sheet  or  income 
statement information).  
Relationship lending is often seen as a powerful mechanism that allows a bank to 
overcome  information  asymmetries  in  credit  markets  (Boot  (2000)),  which  should 
primarily affect small and opaque businesses.  It is not surprising, as a result, that the 
recent organizational changes driven by consolidation in the banking industry (Berger et 
al. (1999)) have risen widely expressed concerns of a severe cut-back in small business 
lending. At the same time, these concerns have sparked a renewed interest by scholars in 
the broader relation between the organizational design of banks and lending conditions, 
in particular pertaining to small firms. 
We  start  by  providing  an  overview  of  the  theoretical  literature  that  studies 
organizational design and delegation of authority in the context of the banking industry. 
We subsequently review the relevant empirical evidence in light of this theory.   17
3.1. Theory 
The economics literature has recently drawn substantial attention to the organizational 
design  of  firms,  focusing  in  particular  on  the  distinctive  features  of  centralized  and 
decentralized systems. The comparative performance of the decentralized and centralized 
allocation systems is typically analyzed on the basis of communication and information 
processing they entail, as well as on the incentives these systems induce on individual 
agents.  Decentralization  involves  the  distribution  of  information  processing 
responsibilities across agents  and  minimal  communication requirements, resembling a 
market-based  system  consistent  with  self-interested  behavior  of  agents.  This  implies, 
however, that an agent who is a delegated decision-making authority tends to act in its 
self-interest, rather than the interest of the organization; in other words, decentralization 
may give rise to internal agency costs. If these incentive problems cannot be contractually 
remedied ex ante, the choice between a centralized and a decentralized system follows 
from the balance between these internal agency costs and communication or information 
processing costs. In particular, a decentralized system is generally the preferred design 
when these agency costs are not too severe (Mookherjee (2006)) or when the activity of 
the organization crucially depends on the agent’s expertise (Berger and Udell (2002), 
Stein (2002)). 
The fact that information is critical to the activity of lending makes the banking sector 
especially  interesting  to  analyze  organizational  theories.  Following  the  recent 
consolidation activity (Berger et al. (1999)), academics have increasingly focused their 
interest to theories that enabled them to assess the potential implications of the induced 
changes in the organizational structure of banks on small business lending.
18 The general 
upshot of these organizational theories is that small banks should be more inclined than 
their  larger  counterparts  to  lending  to  small  and  opaque  firms.  The  main  reason 
supporting this claim  is  the  existence  of  organizational  diseconomies  that  restrict the 
scope  of  large  banks  in  their  lending  activities.  While  several  theories  have  been 
proposed to motivate the existence of such organizational diseconomies, it seems that 
                                                 
18 There is ample  evidence of the importance of a bank relationship to small firms in terms of credit 
availability (Petersen and Rajan (1994)), lower loan rates (Berger and Udell (1995) and Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000)) (in relationship duration and scope, respectively), reduced collateral requirements (Berger 
and Udell (1995)) and intertemporal risk sharing (Petersen and Rajan (1995)).   18
these diseconomies stem altogether from a common origin – the fact that small business 
lending and transactions-based lending are two inherently different activities.
19  
In small business lending, the bank bases largely its credit decisions on proprietary or 
“soft”  information  about  the  firm  and  its  owner  gathered  through  a  multiplicity  of 
contacts over time.  This information allows the bank to assess the quality of the firm 
beyond  what  the  financial  statements  of  the  firm  (the  “hard”  information)  might 
otherwise indicate; therefore it may confer this bank with a competitive advantage over 
banks that make their decisions merely on the basis of “hard” information, as they obtain 
a  less  precise  signal  of  the  creditworthiness  of  the  firm.  This  “soft”  information  is, 
however,  hardly  verifiable  by  anyone  else  than  the  agent  who  produces  it,  and  thus 
difficult to transmit to others or to store. Consequently, the inexistence of proper channels 
to communicate this “soft” information within a bank requires that internal adjustments 
be made at the organizational level. In particular, the bank should adopt a more general 
communication code as well as alternative channels of information transmission within 
the organization, which imposes a cost in terms of specialization (Crémer, Garicano and 
Prat  (2007)).  Put  differently,  the  optimal  organizational  structure  minimizes 
communication costs and expected information losses that result from both horizontal 
and vertical communication of subjective information.
20  
The subjective nature of “soft” information is essentially what makes small business 
lending different from transactional lending, and what restrains more centralized banks 
(e.g. a large bank holding company) from being as competent at relationship lending as 
decentralized  banks  (e.g.  a  small  community  bank).  This  point  is  demonstrated,  for 
example by Stein (2002), who investigates how the organizational structure of a bank 
affects the incentives of loan officers to produce and use different types of information. 
Stein (2002) shows that loan officers in hierarchically complex organizations will have 
less incentive to collect “soft” information since they do not  generally have decision 
making authority, and instead have to report that information to their superiors.
21  In 
contrast, a decentralized organization is more likely to reward research efforts of loan 
                                                 
19 See for example Boot (2000) and Berger and Udell (2002). 
20  See,  for  instance,  Becker  and  Murphy  (1992),  Bolton  and  Dewatripont  (1994),  Radner  (1993)  and 
Garicano (2000). 
21 See also Aghion and Tirole (1997).   19
officers by ensuring that they will have access to funds that they can use to capitalize on 
that  expertise.  Of  course,  one  can  argue  that  “soft”  information  can  be  somewhat 
hardened and subsequently passed on “upwards”.
22  The model in Stein (2002) suggests 
that in this case small banks may still be more efficient providers of relationship-based 
loans than large banks, since the incentives problem turns into a bureaucracy problem, 
i.e. loan officers reallocate excessively their effort from “field work” to report writing. 
The  prediction  that  a  narrower  gap  between  allocation  and  control  promotes 
relationship lending is shared by Berger and Udell (2002), though they rely on a different 
mechanism  to  motivate  the  existence  of  organizational  diseconomies  in  large  banks. 
Berger and Udell (2002) address the key role that a loan officer plays as a repository of 
“soft” information within a bank and focus on the agency problems that this gives rise to. 
As suggested before, these agency problems stem from the intangible nature of “soft” 
information and, in particular, from the difficulty in disseminating this information within 
an organization. This creates a trade-off in terms of the efficiency of  a decentralized 
system.  On  the  one  hand,  as  asserted  in  Stein  (2002),  banks  have  to  delegate  more 
authority to their loan officers, since loan officers are in a unique position to personally 
contact with the firm, its owner and the local community, i.e. they have the greatest 
exposure  to  “soft” information.  On the  other hand,  delegation  may  aggravate  agency 
problems if the incentives of the loan officer are not properly aligned with those of the 
bank.
23  The implications arising from this trade-off have been extensively analyzed in 
the  principal-agent  theory.  According  to  this  theory,  a  bank  that  specializes  in 
relationship loans should invest more in monitoring their loan officers as well as in the 
performance  of  their  loans  (Udell  (1989),  Berger  and  Udell  (2002)).
24    Ultimately, 
                                                 
22  Petersen  (2004)  argues  that  the  categorization  of  information  into  “hard”  and  “soft”  is  often  too 
restrictive. He further suggests that “hard” and “soft” information are the extremes of a continuum along 
which information can be classified. An illustrative example of hardening “soft” information is a loan 
officer filling a report where he evaluates several attributes of an applicant (e.g. honesty and managerial 
competence). 
23 These agency problems may result in the collusion between the loan officer and the firm (Tirole (1986)), 
manipulation of  “soft” information (Godbillon-Camus and Godlewski (2005), Ozbas (2005)), excessive 
use of “discretion” in defining loan terms (Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2007)), overlending  or hiding 
a deteriorating condition of a borrower (Berger and Udell (2002)). 
24  Godbillon-Camus  and  Godlewski  (2004)  use  a  principal-agent  framework  to  study  a  loan  officer’s 
incentives  to  manipulate  the  signals  conveyed  about  potential  borrowers,  which  are  based  on  “soft” 
information. They suggest that an adequate compensation scheme solves ex ante these agency problems.   20
because  these  monitoring  costs  increase  with  the  hierarchical  complexity  of  the 
organization, small decentralized banks are endowed with another source of comparative 
advantage in small business lending. 
The theoretical models presented so far neglect the fact that the competitive structure 
of credit markets (and hence lending conditions) are determined by the reach of all the 
competing banks, which in turn largely depend on their organizational structure. In other 
words,  the  organizational  choices  made  by  a  bank’s  rivals  bound  its  own  scope 
concerning lending decisions. Degryse, Laeven and Ongena (2007) bridge this gap by 
investigating  how  differences  in  rival  banks’  organizational  structures  shape  banking 
competition.  They  start  by  bringing  into  a  theoretical  model  the  evidence  that  banks 
engage in spatial price discrimination (Degryse and Ongena (2005)) together with the 
view  that  organizational  structure  affects  the  nature  of  the  lending  technology  (Stein 
(2002)). Their model extends the Hotelling (1929) location differentiation framework in 
that  they  allow  a  bank’s  organizational  structure  to  act  as  a  lending  technology  that 
determines  a  bank’s  geographical  reach.  Though  they  assume  that  the  marginal  cost 
associated to distance (transportation or monitoring costs) is identical across firms and 
banks for one visit, the required number of visits or monitoring effort is determined by 
the lending technology. For instance, large, hierarchical organizations with automated 
decision-making mechanisms have an economic advantage at lending to distant firms 
since their technology is more cost-effective; because these organizations rely to a larger 
extent on “hard” information, they will communicate less often and in impersonal ways 
with their borrowers, resulting in lower distance-related costs. 
3.2. Empirical evidence 
3.2.1.  Organizational structure and information use within a bank 
A recent stream of empirical work delves into the transmission of different types of 
information  within  an  organization.  Liberti  and  Mian  (2006)  investigate  the  effect  of 
credit  approval  at  higher  hierarchical  levels  on  the  importance  of  “hard”  and  “soft” 
information in the credit approval decision.
25  They use a dataset consisting of detailed 
information  from  the  credit  folders  of  a  multinational  bank  in  Argentina.  The  data 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ozbas (2005) analyze the optimal level of organizational integration when the agents’ (i.e. loan officers’) 
access to resources depends on the signals they communicate to their superiors. 
25 See also Liberti (2005).   21
contains objective as well as subjective assessments collected by the loan officer during 
the  application  process.  This  dataset  also  contains  information  on  how  far  in  the 
hierarchical ladder (and where) the application needs to travel before reaching the final 
credit decision. Consistent with organizational theories, Liberti and Mian (2006) find that 
“hard”  information  gains  importance  while  “soft”  information  loses  importance  when 
going up the hierarchical ladder. They also find that these changes in “hard” and “soft” 
information sensitivity are particularly abrupt when the higher-level officer is located in a 
different branch. This is in line with the view in Petersen (2004), who asserts that the 
subjective nature of “soft” information makes its communication across large distances 
difficult.  Liberti  and  Mian  (2006)  also  find  that  the  decrease  in  sensitivity  to  “soft” 
information is less pronounced when information is assembled by more experienced loan 
officers. They cannot say, however, whether this result is due to a “reputation effect” or 
due to superior communication skills of more experienced loan officers (Ozbas (2005); 
see also Crémer, Garicano and Prat (2007)) 
Despite  providing  support  to  the  view  that  communicating  subjective  information 
across hierarchies is costly, Liberti and Mian (2006) are unable to isolate the channel 
driving this effect. Their results strongly suggest that it is the physical distance (and not 
necessarily  the  hierarchical  gap)  generating  the  loss  of  credit  sensitivity  to  “soft” 
information,  which  Casolaro  and  Mistrulli  (2007)  define  as  informational  distance. 
Consistent with this view, Casolaro and Mistrulli (2007) find that loan rates charged by 
Italian banks correlate negatively with the distance between the borrower and the bank’s 
headquarters,  a  measure  of  the  bank’s  ability  to  extract  “soft”  information  from  the 
borrower. Mian (2006) employs data from Pakistan and also shows that the geographical 
distance between a foreign bank’s headquarter and the local branches leads the bank to 
shy away from relationship lending. In contrast, Liberti (2004) provides support for the 
loan  officers’  incentives  view  in  Stein  (2002)  by  demonstrating  that  relationship 
managers who receive more authority put more effort into collecting “soft” information 
from their corporate clients. 
In  short,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  depreciation  of  “soft”  information  across 
hierarchies  results  mainly  from  failures  in  the  communication  process,  incentive 
problems or from agency problems that eventually reduce the reliability and usefulness of   22
“soft” information to the eyes of higher hierarchies.  This issue remains an open question 
that awaits further research. 
3.2.2.  Organizational structure and information use across banks 
The  theory  predicts  that  organizations  where  there  is  a  narrower  gap  between 
allocation and control are more efficient providers of relationship-based small business 
loans.  There  has  been  a  recent  considerable  research  effort  to  empirically  test  this 
premise, primarily in response to the public concerns that the financial services industry 
consolidation trend might result in the reduction in the availability of credit to small firms 
(Berger et al. (1999)). These concerns are founded on the fact that small businesses have 
crucially  relied  on  banks  to  satisfy  their  credit  needs  (Cole,  Wolken  and  Woodburn 
(1996), Berger and Udell (1998)), and further reinforced by the evidence that large banks 
allocate smaller percentages of their assets to small business loans than do small banks 
(Berger and Udell (1996), DeYoung, Goldberg and White (1999), Keeton (1995), Peek 
and Rosengren (1996), Strahan and  Weston  (1996)).  Moreover, it is  empirically  well 
established that small banks are better able to collect and act on “soft” information (Scott 
(2004),  Cole,  Goldberg  and  White  (2004),  Berger  et  al.  (2005),  Uchida,  Udell  and 
Watanabe  (2007),  Casolaro  and  Mistrulli  (2007)),  which  presupposes  that  the 
organizational  design  of  small  banks  enables  them  to  shoulder  such  screening  and 
monitoring efforts. Contradictory evidence is provided, for example, by Jayaratne and 
Wolken (1999); they find that the probability that a small firm is credit rationed does not 
significantly depend on the presence of small banks in the market, suggesting that small 
banks do not have a cost advantage in making small business loans. A similar conclusion 
can be drawn from Black and Strahan (2002), who find that the liberalization of banking 
laws  in  the  U.S.  increased  the  rate  of  creation  of  new  businesses,  though  it 
simultaneously reduced the number as well as the share of small banks.  
The  documented  evidence  provides  insufficient  indication  that  a  bank’s 
organizational structure affects credit availability to small businesses. In fact, the theory 
clearly states that it is organizational complexity rather than bank size shaping a bank’s 
proclivity to make small-business loans. Not surprisingly, studies that analyze the effect 
of  organizational  complexity  on  lending  conditions  to  small  firms  also  provide 
inconclusive  evidence,  which  may  be  explained  by  the  variety  of  dimensions  of   23
organizational complexity these studies employ. For instance, Strahan and Weston (1998) 
find  that the  organizational complexity  of  a holding  company  (measured  as  the  total 
number  of  bank  subsidiaries  and  the  number  of  states  in  which  it  operates)  is  not 
significantly associated with its propensity to lend to small firms. In contrast, Keeton 
(1995) finds that banks with a large number of branches and banks owned by out-of-state 
holding companies devote lower proportions of their deposits to small businesses than do 
comparable banks. DeYoung, Goldberg and White (1999) control for the confounding 
effects of a bank’s size and age and obtain similar results. Degryse, Laeven and Ongena 
(2007) demonstrate that the presence of larger and hierarchically organized rivals in the 
vicinity reduces the geographical reach of the lending bank and assuages spatial pricing. 
Studies  that  focus  on  the  effects  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&As)  are  also 
relevant in this context as M&As should involve significant changes in organizational 
focus.    This  literature  could  not  agree  on  an  unambiguous  effect  of  consolidation  in 
banking markets on credit supply to small firms.  The available evidence indicates that 
small bank M&As have a positive effect on small business lending (Strahan and Weston 
(1996, 1998)), whereas large bank M&As have the opposite effect (Berger et al. (1998), 
Peek and Rosengren (1998), Sapienza (2002)). These results are particularly interesting 
as  they  rule  out  the  existence  of  a  monotonic  relation  between  the  organizational 
complexity of a bank and its propensity to lend to small businesses.  In particular, these 
results suggest that portfolio-diversification considerations or regulatory constraints may 
prevent low-capitalized, small banks from fully concentrating on relationship loans. 
Substantial academic interest has been also devoted to the countervailing force that 
technological  progress  may  play  on  the  organizational  advantage  that  small  banks 
apparently have in small business lending. The exponential development in information 
and  communication  technologies  led  to  the  emergence  of  automated  decision 
mechanisms (e.g. credit scoring), which enable organizational complex organizations to 
generate large volumes of small loans at distance (Cyrnak and Hannan (2001)) and at low 
cost  (Berger  and  Udell  (1996)).
26  Consistent  with  this  view,  Frame,  Srinivasan  and 
Woosley (2001) and Frame, Padhi and Woosley (2001) find that the adoption of small 
                                                 
26 See Altman and Saunders (1997), Hand and Henley (1997) and Mester (1997) for detailed information 
about the introduction of credit scoring models in the banking industry.   24
business  credit  scoring  by  large  banks  substantially  increased  their  portfolio  share  of 
small business loans. In addition, Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) show that the adoption 
of  small  business  credit  scoring  by  large  banks  is  associated  with  expanded  credit 
availability  for  risky,  small  businesses.  Yet,  many  firms,  perhaps  due  to  poor  credit 
histories  or  to  intrinsic  opaqueness,  may  not  be  eligible  for  such  a  scored-based, 
transactional loan. While a large bank is likely to ration credit to these applicants, small 
banks may still be able to offer these firms the traditional relationship-driven loans. 
4.  Conclusion 
A growing body of theoretical and empirical literature studies the real effects of the 
recent changes at the organizational as well as operational level in the banking industry. 
We review the literature that focuses on the effects of both bank-firm distance and bank 
organizational structure on lending decisions.  
Despite the several empirical attempts to test the existing theories, many questions 
remain unanswered. Concerning the role of distance, there is strong evidence of spatial 
pricing by banks, but it is still unclear what is the underlying mechanism driving it. In 
particular, we question: (i) if transportation costs drive spatial pricing, then why has the 
distance  between  firms  and  banks  increased  steadily  (leading  to  such  an  apparent 
inefficient  outcome)?  (ii)  if  information  asymmetry  is  instead  the  main  driving 
mechanism, why there is so little evidence on the occurrence of spatial credit rationing? 
Concerning organizational structure, it is not clear the extent to what small banks have 
the  widely  preached  advantage  in  relationship  lending.  The  incongruous  empirical 
findings suggest that, if present, that advantage should not be immense; but even more 
puzzling  is  the  nature  of  that  potential  advantage,  which  can  result  from  agency  or 
communication costs that banks face internally. 
In  short,  despite  notable  research  efforts,  the  complex  net  of  relations  linking 
distance, organizational structure and lending conditions is far from dismantled. As a 
result, the most likely conclusion springing from this chapter is that further research is 
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